Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory by Brilmayer, Lea




I. TOWARDS A VERTICAL PERSPECTIVE . . • • . • . . . . . 295





III. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS .....•..•••....... 308
IV. JURISDICTIONAL AND DOMESTIC DUE PROCESS
COMPARED . . . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 310
This paper is about the link between due process and political
theory, and more specifically, about the link between a particular sort
of due process issue and political theory. The goal is to add to the
agenda an important legal issue that has not captured its fair share
of philosophical attention. As this symposium demonstrates, pro-
cedural due process analysis has benefited greatly from the attention
of legal philosophers. Its foundations are far clearer and more interest-
ing than they would be if left to straight doctrinal analysis. The time
has come for legal philosophers, and philosophically inclined lawyers,
to shine some comparable light on the foundations of jurisdiction.
We are already familiar with two varieties of due process problems:
procedural due process problems and substantive due process prob-
lems. This conference focuses on procedural due process. But what is
inadequately appreciated is that procedural due process itself contains
at least two sorts of inquiries: domestic due process and jurisdictional
due process. Domestic due process is the sort of issue that most
constitutional theorists think of when they hear the words "due pro-
cess." Perhaps the usual focus is even narrower. Modern due process
scholarship often concentrates on the procedural due process of prob-
*Nathan Baker Professor, Yale Law School. The author thanks the participants at the
Procedural Due Process Conference for their oral comments, and in particular wishes to thank
Carl Wellman and Jerry Mashaw for comments on the written draft, and Tim Macht for his
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lems inherent in the so-called "new propertY,"l for example, claims
against government entitlement programs or claims to government
employment. This focus tends to overlook traditional garden variety
due process problems, even though they are still purely domestic due
process issues. Traditional due process problems include the applica-
tion of res judicata or other preclusion doctrines, which foreclose a
litigant from raising claims that may not already have been adequately
aired. But even these relatively neglected due process issues are for-
tunate in comparison to issues of jurisdictional due process.
Jurisdictional due process issues concern the right of a state to
assert adjudicatory or legislative authority over interstate disputes or
over ~esidents of other states who claim to have insufficient contact
with the forum court attempting to exercise authority. They involve
doctrinal questions of legislative authority (choice of law), adjudicatory
authority (personal jurisdiction), criminal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to
tax, and many others. The link with political theory lies in the argu-
ment that such issues should be analyzed in terms of a state's right
to exercise coercive power over the individual or dispute. Traditionally,
political theory has treated as central the issue of the legitimacy of
the state's exercise of coercive power. The state's right to assert
authority over its citizens acting within its territory has been subjected
to intense critical scrutiny by theorists from Aristotle, Hobbes, and
Locke, to Nozick and Rawls.
The justifications suggested by such theorists should shed some
light on the issue of coercive power over nonresidents and interstate
disputes. These issues of interstate power are far more attenuated
than simple justification of the exercise of domestic power. The
theoretical questions are, nonetheless, analogous. Does an individual
have sufficient contact with a state to entitle the state to assert coer-
cive power? Can an adequate justification for political obligation be
found? What theories of political obligation are reflected in our federal
Constitution? When does power asserted over interstate cases comport
with jurisdictional due process?
Political theory is applicable to jurisdictional issues in the following
way. Any justification for the exercise of state power will contain a
set of reasons explaining why state coercive power is legitimate. Im-
1. The articles in the symposium exhibit such a focus; several of them deal explicitly with
new property issues. See Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 u. FLA. L. REV. 323 (1987); Terrell, Liberty and Respon-
sibility in the Land of "New Property": Exploring the Limits of Procedural Due Process, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 351 (1987).
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plicit in such a set of reasons is an explanation of the conditions under
which state coercion is justified. Therefore, coercion will be justified
in some circumstances while unjustified in others. Justifiable coercion
depends upon whether those necessary conditions are satisfied. Cases
that are outside the state's jurisdiction, under this view, are cases
that are beyond the legitimate exercise of coercive power. A theory
of the American law of jurisdiction, in other words, should be based
upon a political theory consistent with the norms underlying the Amer-
ican Constitution, and should reflect the criteria of justification that
such underlying political norms implicitly incorporate.
1. TOWARDS A VERTICAL PERSPECTIVE
It might be thought that this is the only or obvious approach to
jurisdictional due process. Nothing would be farther from the truth.
Indeed, there are at least four other ways to approach the issue of
jurisdiction. Each is different from the political rights approach argued
here, which is a "vertical" perspective on the interstate allocation of
authority.
To see why this is a "vertical" approach, one might contrast it
with the first existing alternative, which is the traditional horizontal
approach to state sovereignty. States can be conceived as individual
actors, concerned to define their powers vis-a.-vis other states. Inter-
state relations are analogous, under this view, to interpersonal rela-
tions in that they involve the interactions of formal equals.2 Such a
horizontal perspective contrasts sharply with a vertical emphasis on
the relationship between a state and an individual over whom it exer-
cises power. This is a hierarchical relationship, not a relationship of
formal equality. Indeed, vertical analysis does not presuppose conflict
between competing sovereigns. Problems of vertical authority might
arise where a state sought to exercise coercive power over an indi-
vidual living in Antarctica, even though no other sovereign sought to
intervene.3 They might also arise even if other involved states had no
motive to contest the assertion of authority.
A second alternative to the vertical approach is a modern functional
approach to jurisdiction. This modern functional approach has won
2. One description of such a horizontal view, and a criticism of its philosophical weaknesses,
can be found in C. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
3. In this respect, one might contrast due process, which focuses on the statermdividual
relationship, ,vith full faith and credit, which by its terms requires credit to the laws of other
states. The former is oriented towards the vertical perspective; the latter towards the horizontal
perspective.
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adherence in several justices' separate opinions in the United States
Reports.4 This approach seeks to analyze jurisdictional due process
issues in a manner qualitatively similar to analysis of domestic pro-
cedural due process issues. Thus, for instance, personal jurisdiction
issues might be analyzed in terms of notice and opportunity to defend.
Geographical distances, after all, make it inconvenient to collect and
present evidence. If sufficiently substantial, the inconvenience might
violate the requirement of an opportunity to defend. Such analysis
reduces interstate problems to intrastate problems, setting aside ques-
tions of legitimate authority posed by jurisdictional boundaries. Simi-
larly, one might reduce all choice of law problems to questions of
whether forum law itself is substantively unfair or idiosyncratic. Only
in such situations, it could be argued, would due process be violated,
for if the law was unfair or idiosyncratic its application would result
in unfair surprise.
This sort of approach sidesteps important issues of political legiti-
macy. It refuses to analyze whether particular exercises of sovereign
authority are appropriate. Moreover, this approach confuses the fair-
ness of a rule or a decision procedure with the fairness of applying it
in a particular instance. An illustration will show how there might be
issues of fairness of the applicability of a process, quite aside from
the considerations of the fairness of the process that is being applied.
Although it is an example that would not typically be thought of as
jurisdictional, it is conceptually somewhat similar and may be a more
obvious illustration of the same point.
The example concerns arbitration. Often, commercial contracts con-
tain arbitration clauses providing a means for settling disputes in the
event of a contract disagreement. Each side may get to name one
arbitrator, and the two chosen arbitrators will select a third. The
location of arbitration and applicable rules of law may be specified. It
seems safe to assume that an arbitration process that is set up in this
way is, typically, a fair decision process.
It should be clear, however, that fairness ofthe existing arbitration
process is not the only issue. There is also an issue of why it is fair
to require a party to submit his or her dispute to arbitration. Typically,
a ready answer is that the party agreed to arbitration in advance,
through the contract. There may, however, be problems with the
4. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring);
World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
HeinOnline -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 297 1987
1987] DUE PROCESS AND POLITICAL THEORY 297
effectiveness of the consent. For example, the consent clause may
have been in fine print or inserted through the fraud of one of the
parties. The point is merely that the issue of the fairness of requiring
the parties to arbitrate is different from the issue of the fairness of
the arbitration process itself.
The issue of the fairness of the process and the issue of the fairness
of the applicability of the process are linked, but conceptually separ-
able. They are linked because both issues seem crucial to the fairness
of holding the parties to the end result. Thus, even if the parties
agreed in advance to arbitration, this consent might be considered
ineffective if the arbitration procedure itself was fundamentally unfair.
One might not, under this view, be allowed in advance to bind oneself
to an unfair decision process, in the same way that one might not be
allowed to sell oneself into slavery. Consent to an unjust institution
is ineffective.
Conversely, it is plausible that even a fair procedure may not be in-
voked unless it is fair to apply it to the protesting party. If one wishes
to get fanciful, one might imagine lots of procedures that would be fair
if agreed to in advance, but unfair if the parties have not consented.
While we might agree in advance to flip a coin if we have a contract
dispute, this is not a decision procedure that can be imposed unilater-
ally or after the fact. Nor would it be fair to require submission of
the dispute to a rabbinical court, although again we might agree to
such an arrangement in advance.
The two issues of fairness of applicability and process fairness are
linked in that both can figure into the evaluation of the enforceability
of the eventual result. However, they are distinct in that it is entirely
plausible to say that defects in process fairness are not cured by
fairness of applicability, and defects in fairness of applicability are not
cured by process fairness. I am not arguing that the two sorts of
fairness can never compensate for one another. It is conceivable that
one can consent in advance to a grossly unfair decision process, or
that no consent is necessary where the process is truly fair. But the
fact that one might compensate for the other does not mean they are
the same issue, only that it is controversial what the relationship is
between the two separate issues. For this reason, merely showing
that the process would be fair if applied domestically does not solve
the issue of legitimate authority.
There is a third modern approach to jurisdictional issues that is
also distinct from the vertical approach that I am proposing. That
approach is to decide jurisdictional disputes on the basis of whether
the state in question has an "interest" that would be advanced by
asserting authority. This sort of approach is most familiar as a choice
of law methodology, although it is also sometimes brought to bear on
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issues of adjudicative jurisdiction.5 The difference between such an
approach to jurisdictional issues and the vertical perspective is that
the inquiry is not phrased in terms of the protesting parties' rights,
but in terms of what would advance the policies of the involved states.
I should emphasize that "rights" as the term is used here does not
assume any particular definition of rights. Rights might be Kantian,
utilitarian, or based upon the will of Allah. But to talk in terms of
rights is to phrase things in terms of justification, and simply to point
to a state's understandable desire to have its way is not necessarily
to justify its use of coercive power.6
A fourth approach speaks in terms of rights, but it does so in a
rather different way than the political rights theory that I rely upon.
Developed by my colleague Professor Perry Dane,7 it borrows from
the earlier "vested rights" approach to choice of law, suggesting that
states should view interjurisdictional disputes as being uniquely sus-
ceptible to the authority of a single state.8 It sees the role of courts
as being the implementation of the rights that individuals acquire
under a state's authority, rather than merely the implementation of
the policy preferences that a state has adopted. A reaction to the
legal realists' approach to jurisdictional theory, such a vested rights
account assumes that individuals have rights to particular results, and
that courts should strive to identify and enforce them.
The similarity to the vertical theory adopted here lies in the em-
phasis on rights. But the rights are of a different sort. They are rights
in the Dworkinian sense,9 rights to a particular result in a lawsuit. It
5. The seminal choice of law authority for analysis of governmental interests is B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). With regard to personal jurisdiction,
see World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state
has a legitimate interest in enforcing highway laws).
6. It might be thought that utilitarian "rights" are not really ''rights'' but merely policies,
which the state is not free to employ to trump the claims of individuals. Cj. R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (contrasting rights-based adjudication based on principles
with decision based on policies). Yet in the broader sense in whic~ I use the term, utilitarian
rights can exist. Utilitarianism, after all, counts into the equation the preferences of the coerced
individual, according those preferences an equal weight to the preferences of others. The policy-
based analysis criticized in the text accords no such weight to the needs of the out-of-stater.
It merely asks whether the application of local law would further the democratically expressed
preferences of the citizens of the forum.
7. Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1193 (1987).
8. Joseph Beale developed the original vested rights theory in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
9. See generally R. DWORKIN, supra note 6.
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is assumed under such a theory that right answers exist. The vertical
political rights approach that I am proposing does not make this as-
sumption. One might claim, for instance, that Florida has no right to
regulate one's conduct without simultaneously insisting that the proper
law is the law of some other state. For instance, I might concede that
either New York or Connecticut has political authority over my ac-
tions, so that either law might properly apply. Dane's and Dworkin's
rights are rights to a particular result.
II. JURISDICTIONAL DUE PROCESS: THE DOCTRINE
Although a vertical political theory perspective is rather different
from the approaches that most scholars have taken to the subject, it
finds surprising case law support. Tucked here and there in the case
reports are intimations that when judges are faced with jurisdictional
issues they turn, almost instinctively, to theorizing about the proper
scope of a state's political authority. These intimations are found in
the various areas of jurisdictional doctrine.
One such doctrinal context is the problem of adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. If you travel from your domicile in Connecticut to Florida for a
conference, and while there you defame a conference participant from
Missouri, then Florida has a right to require you to return to defend
a defamation action in that state. The offended participant may choose,
in the alternative, to sue you in Connecticut. What the defamed person
probably cannot do, however, is return home to Missouri and require
you to come there to defend. The doctrinal question is posed in terms
of "minimum contacts"ilO whether there exists sufficient connection
with the forum such that it is fair to be required to travel to that
jillisdiction to litigate. Florida would have such contacts, as the site
of the defamation. Connecticut would have sufficient minimum contacts
because it has authority by virtue of residence or domicile.
Another problem along these lines concerns the right of a state to
apply its own law to the controversy.ll Again, in the defamation case,
the most likely alternatives are Florida and Connecticut. These are
the states that seem to have the most legitimate claims to tell you
what to do. And once again, the question can easily be phrased as a
problem of political theory. What are the connections that one might
10. For a general account of the ''minimum contacts" theory, see Brilmayer, How Contacts
Count, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 66.
11. For a general account of choice of law theory, see L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1986).
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have with a state, or foreign nation, that would give it a right to tell
you what to do in such circumstances?
A closely related issue concerns the problem of jurisdiction to tax. 12
As with the other two examples, this is an issue of the state's right
to exercise coercive power. Even if one concedes that states in general
have rights to tax persons against their will (the extent of the right
to tax for public purposes being, of course, philosophically controver-
sial) this does not mean that all states have a right to tax some
particular individual. To whom does Smith owe her taxes? All states
may be equally fair; all may put tax revenues to equally good purposes.
But this does not mean that they all have equal rights to tax poor
Smith, who would be utterly impoverished if they all chose to do so.
In cases discussing the forum's right to adjudicate a dispute, to
apply its law, or to impose a tax, the Supreme Court has relied on
rather unsophisticated versions of familiar arguments about political
obligation. Some of these arguments are territorial in nature while
others arise out of the relationship between a citizen and the govern-
ment. When pushed to explain why such things should matter, the
Court has drawn upon theories of receiving benefits from either doing
business in a state or being a member of the community. Another
way to justify assertion of sovereign authority is through explicit or
tacit consent. All of these arguments are familiar, of course, in the
literature of political theory.
A. Territorialism
In Pennoyer v. Neff,I3 the Supreme Court adopted a territorial
theory of jurisdiction:
Every state owes protection to its own citizens; and, when
non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise
of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by
such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in
virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-
resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire
into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens . . . .14
While Pennoyer was a dispute over judicial jurisdiction, the territorial
principle was also followed in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
CO.,I5 dealing with applicability of American law:
12. See generally w.
13. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
14. ld. at 723.
15. 213 U.S. 347 (1908).
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[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done . . . . For another
jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the
place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another
• 16sovereIgn ....
These holdings are reminiscent of John Locke's argument in The Sec-
ond Treatise:
Whoever, therefore, from thenceforth by inheritance, pur-
chase, permission or otherwise, enjoys any part of the land so
annexed to, and under the government of that commonwealth,
must take it with the condition it is under - that is, of submit-
ting to the government of the commonwealth under whose
jurisdiction it is as far forth as any subject of it.
Locke also said that "those who . . . come within the territories
belonging to any government" are bound to pay homage to its laws. 17
B. Membership
In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has held that membership
in a political community is an adequate basis for assertion of coercive
authority. Blackmer v. United States,I8 for instance, dealt with the
power of Congress to subpoena a United States citizen living abroad.
In holding that such power existed, the Court explained:
While it appears that the petitioner removed his residence
to France in the year 1924, it is undisputed that he was, and
continued to be, a citizen of the United States. He continued
to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obliga-
tions of citizenship, the United States maintained its authority
over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to
him in a foreign country. 19
This holding was reiterated in Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore. 2o
The Court in Old Dominion held that a state has the power to enforce
16. ld. at 356.
17. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT §§ 119-21 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
18. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
19. ld. at 436.
20. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
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its law over a citizen domiciled within the state, even when on the
high seas. "[T]he bare fact of the parties being outside the territory,
in a place belonging to no other sovereign, would not limit the authority
of the state ...."21 Similarly, in Skiriotes v. Florida,22 the Court
said, "[E]ven if it were assumed that the locus of the offense was
outside the territorial waters of Florida, it would not follow that the
State could not prohibit its own citizens from the use of the described
divers' equipment at that place."23
In United States v. Bowman,24 three Americans and one Briton
planned to defraud the United States government while aboard a ship
outside of Brazil. The three Americans were apprehended and brought
to trial. The Court asserted: "the three defendants who were found
in New York were citizens of the United States and were certainly
subject to such laws as it might pass to protect itself and its property.
Clearly it is no offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of Brazil
to hold them for this crime against the government to which they owe
allegiance."25 The Court, in contrast, seemed to accept the possibility
that the United States Court might have no jurisdiction over the
subject of Great Britain when he is brought to trial.
C. Benefits
These cases that cite the obligation that a citizen has to his or her
government do not tell us much about why this obligation exists or
on what it is based. Other decisions do seem to go some distance
toward explaining this. In Milliken v. Meye'flG the Court wrote:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not termi-
nated by the mere fact of his absence from the state. The state
which accords him privileges and affords protection to him and
his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal
duties. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the
state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its
laws, are inseparable from the various incidences of state
citizenship. The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of
the relationship to the state which domicile creates. That re-
21. Id. at 403.
22. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
23. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
24. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
25. Id. at 102.
26. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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lationship is not dissolved by mere absence from the state. The
attendant duties, like the rights and privileges incident to
domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the
state.Zl
Under this theory, the privileges and protection the state grants to
its citizens continue after they leave the state. Therefore, the state
may demand reciprocal duty from an absent citizen.
In La'lvrence v. State Tax Commission,28 the Court concluded that
a state has power to tax its own citizens on income derived wholly
from activities carried on by them outside of the state because of the
"rights and privileges incident to . . . domicile in the state."29 Similarly
in Maguire v. Trefry,30 the Court held that the benefits the individual
receives from the government bind the individual to support that
government by paying income tax, on the theory that "[g]overnment
provides for him all the advantages of living in safety and in freedom
and of being protected by the law. It gives security to life, liberty
and the other privileges of dwelling in a civilized community. It exacts
in return a contribution to the support of that government . . . ."31
In United States v. Bennett,32 the Court held that Congress had
the right to levy a tax on the use, by a United States citizen, of a
yacht that was never within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. It was argued that Congress had no power to tax in this case
because a government does not have the capacity to confer benefit
and afford protection outside of its territory. The Court in Bennett
responded that this was confused thought:
[T]he confusion of thought exists in mistaking the scope and
extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation,
and its relation to its citizens and their relations to it. It pre-
sumes that government does not, by its very nature, benefit
the citizen and his property wherever found. Indeed, the argu-
ment, while holding on to citizenship, belittles and destroys its
advantages and blessings by denying the possession by govern-
ment of an essential power required to make citizenship com-
pletely beneficial.33
27. ld. at 463-64 (citations omitted).
28. 286 U.S. 276 (1931).
29. ld. at 281.
30. 253 U.S. 12 (1919).
31. ld. at 14 (quoting Maguire v. Tax Comm'r, 230 Mass. 503, 513, 120 N.E. 162, 166 (1918)).
32. 232 U.S. 299 (1913).
33. ld. at 307.
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In other words, as explained in Cook v. Tait,34 "[t]he principle was
declared that the government by its very nature, benefits the citizen
and his property wherever found, and therefore has the power to
make the benefit complete."35 The Cook court declared Congress had
the power to tax income received by a native citizen of the United
States, domiciled abroad, from property situated abroad, because the
citizen owes the government for the benefits that the citizen continues
to receive.
In these cases, citizenship seems to imply a benefit to the individual
and therefore allegiance and debt to the state. Indeed, in Luria v.
United States,36 the Court wrote, "Citizenship is membership in a
political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the
member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These
are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other."37
The Court went on to explain why aliens are admitted to this country
in these terms.
[I]t was contemplated that his [an alien's] admission should be
mutually beneficial to the government and himself, the proof
in respect of his established residence, moral character, and
attachment to the principles of the Constitution being exacted
because of what they promised for the future, rather than for
what they told of the past.38
These cases focus on the benefits of membership as a basis for
asserting state authority. However, the territorial rule also can be
explained in terms of benefits, the benefits of doing business in the
state. Thus even nonmembers might be bound under a benefits theory.
The minimum contact test for adjudicative jurisdiction, for example,
seems to be based upon a notion of fairness of being obligated to a
state from which one receives benefits. A familiar passage from Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington39 reads:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
34. 265 U.S. 47 (1923).
35. Id. at 56.
36. 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id. at 23.
39. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue. 40
And in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,41 the Court
argued similarly that "[a]s active participants in interstate and foreign
commerce take advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities
offered by the various States, it is only fair and reasonable to subject
them to the obligations that may be imposed by those jurisdictions."42
Whether the benefits are thought to flow from membership in a
community - as in Milliken v. Meyer - or in the conduct of in-state
activities - as in International Shoe - they find a ready analog in
the literature of political obligation. Both Rawls and Hart have
analyzed political obligation in terms of reaping the benefits of others'
compliance with a system of laws. 43 Indeed, their reference to this
argument as a principle of "fair play" is remarkably reminiscent of
the International Shoe formula, "fair play and substantial justice."44
Again, the Court has instinctively anticipated the arguments of polit-
ical philosophers, although in a rather unsophisticated way.
D. Consent
Other philosophical theories are also reflected in the cases. Loosely
linked together are notions of consent, tacit consent, and intentionality.
Consent has almost universally been recognized as a basis for jurisdic-
tion. By inserting a clause into a contract, a defendant may agree to
be bound by a state's laws or subject to its adjudicative procedures.
In National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent,45 the Supreme Court held
that such clauses generally satisfied due process.
Tacit consent is another theory that has been employed. For in-
stance, in St. Clair v. COX,46 the Supreme Court stated:
40. ld. at 319.
41. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
42. ld. at 423.
43. Hart, Are There any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil. Rev. 185 (Apr. 1955); Rawls, Legal
Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (S. Hook ed. 1964).
44. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940».
45. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
46. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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If a state permits a foreign corporation to do business within
her limits, and at the same time provides that in suits against
it for business there done, process shall be served upon its
agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the permis-
sion; and corporations that subsequently do business in the
state are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as
though they had specifically authorized their agents to receive
service of the process.47
Hess v. Pawloski48 added that "the State may declare that the use of
the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment
of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served."49
The tacit consent theory is a familiar theory in the philosophical
literature. I mentioned earlier that some of Locke's arguments support
a territorialist view. The rationale underlying Locke's territorialism
was tacit consent. Locke argued, for instance, that walking upon the
highways or residing in the territory amounted to a consent to the
sovereign's authority.50 Locke, indeed, could have been contemplating
the situation in Hess v. Pawloski when he penned those words! He
anticipated by several centuries the argument that a nonresident
motorist entering the state tacitly consents to service of process upon
the secretary of state!
In keeping with consent as a basis for assertion of authority, the
Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the importance of the
defendant's awareness or intent to submit to jurisdiction. In World
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,51 for instance, the Court stated that
due process required that ''the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."52 The Court has also indicated that under
the benefit theory there must be some intention to receive the benefits
in question. In Hanson v. Denckla,53 the Court interpreted Interna-
tional Shoe to require that "in each case . . . there be some act by
which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
47. ld. at 356.
48. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
49. ld. at 357; see also Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1933); Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856).
50. J. LOCKE, supra note 17, § 119.
51. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
52. ld. at 297.
53. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."54
Language in World-Wide Volkswagen55 also suggests that a key
issue of jurisdiction is whether the party actually intended to gain
benefits from the State in question. The decision tells us that when
a defendant "purposely avails"66 himself or herself of benefits, there
is "clear notice"57 of being subject to suit. Thus, connections with the
state can be severed if the risks are too great. Continued dealing,
furthermore, seems to show an intention to take the risks and benefits
involved.
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor
. . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States ....66
There seems in these cases to be an effort to show that the manufac-
turer's continued service in the state implies a determination that the
benefits outweigh the costs. Recall Robert Nozick's argument in Anar-
chy State and Utopia59 that "[a]t the very least one wants to build
into the principle of fairness the condition that the benefits to a person
from the actions of others are greater than the costs of doing his
share."GO Nozick said that such a principle could not be formulated
"without obviating the need for other persons' consenting to cooperate
and limit their own activities."61 In keeping with these suggestions is
the insistence that political coercion be predicated upon deliberate,
purposeful acts; that responsibilities be a matter of "obligation" and
not mere "duties."62
While these cases fail to establish clearly a specific political theory
of legal jurisdiction, it is striking how they reflect the traditional
themes of justification in the literature of political philosophy. But
even if striking, it should not be surprising. A court facing a question
54. [d. at 253 (emphasis added).
55. 444 U.S. at 297.
56. 357 U.S. at 253.
57. 444 U.S. at 297.
58. [d.
59. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
60. [d. at 94.
61. [d. at 95 (emphasis added).
62. A. SIIIIIIIONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979).
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of its own authority over an individual, insisting that he or she is not
subject to that authority, can hardly approach the issue any other
way. The tools that most readily come to hand are consent and tacit
consent, receipt of benefits, political membership, and presence within
the territory.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
While the cases speak in language reminiscent of political
philosophy, the rationales that they offer are deeply unsatisfying. Of
course, United States Reports is hardly an adequate forum for
philosophical debate. But even if bolstered by arguments from the
philosophical literature, closer examination shows that today we still
lack an adequate account of political obligation.
Consider first the most simplistic alternative, naked territoriality.
The defects in this theory are rather obvious. It is not, in fact, a
theory at all, but merely a statement of a conclusion. The state has
a right to apply its law, or otherwise assert coercive authority, because
it has a right to regulate what goes on within its territory. But why?
The rationale seems to beg the very question that it tries to answer,
namely, the source of its own authority. Unless supported by some
sort of additional reasoning it is theoretically inadequate.
The Supreme Court has no more stopped with such an explanation,
however, than have philosophers. Pennoyer v. Neff, and the simple
territorialism it represented, are generally conceded to have been
ousted by later developments such as International Shoe. 63 Locke, as
we have seen, did not stop with naked territorialism either, but jus-
tified territorial obligation by a theory of tacit consent. We must
therefore examine these explanations of territoriality - tacit consent,
benefits, membership, and so forth - in our search for a more complete
rationale.
What we find, however, is that they are flawed for almost the
same reasons that flaw territoriality. Indeed, on closer examination
they seem merely to be variations on a territorial theme. For example,
consider tacit consent. How does one supposedly tacitly consent to
the authority of the State of Florida? By using the Florida highways,
entering into Florida to transact business, or something of that sort.
Florida might not, for instance, declare that attending a conference
in Chicago amounted to tacit consent to the application of Florida law
63. For a historical account of personal jurisdiction, see L. BRILMAYER, supra note 11,
at 24-26.
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or to subjection to Florida adjudicatory authority. In this respect,
tacit consent is derivative of a theory of territoriality. It is only with
regard to in-state activities that Florida might attach conditions.
Therefore, the tacit consent argument turns on prior notions that a
state has a right to regulate within its own boundaries.
The problem cannot be solved, as might be thought, by emphasizing
notice. The notice argument would suggest that the reason Florida
cannot treat going to a Chicago convention as tacit consent is because
persons would not know that going to Chicago counted as consent.
The notice argument is unpersuasive, however, because even ifFlorida
notified people in advance what it considered tacit consent, Florida
still could not treat going to Chicago as a basis for jurisdiction. For
instance, if Florida placed television ads warning of the consequences
of visiting Chicago, its case for asserting authority would not be im-
proved. Conversely, entering Florida is taken as notice that Florida
law will be applied only because it is safe to assume that most people
would recognize application of Florida law as a reasonable consequence
of entering the state. People are on notice because they would them-
selves realize that such application is fair. Florida need not specifically
communicate to visitors the consequences of entering Florida; but this
returns us once more to the question of what is fair.
For similar reasons, the argument based upon membership is highly
problematic. Obligations based upon membership might be explained
in terms of a member's right to vote. The right to vote is a benefit
that justifies, under such a theory, the obligation to obey. But surely
this is too simple. Assume that Florida decides to extend to Gorbachev
the right to vote in Florida elections, and notifies him of this fact.
Gorbachev is not for that reason obligated to obey Florida law. The
"right to participate gives rise to obligation to obey" argument makes
sense only with regard to persons who already stand in the appropriate
authority relationship to the government in question. The government
must have some right to foist this trade upon the individual for the
individual to be thus obliged. Typically, the group of persons so obliged
is delimited territorially to persons residing in the territory. Again,
we need some theory of territoriality prior to a more sophisticated
concept such as membership.
A.J. Simmons has made a somewhat similar point with regard to
benefits theory and territoriality.&t He notes that it might benefit
Canadians that Americans abide by their own laws, but this does not
64. Siml11ons, supra note 62, at 122.
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compel Canadians to adhere to American law. None of what I have
said in the last few pages proves that an adequate justification for
territoriality could not be developed, although for reasons I develop
elsewhere, I am somewhat skeptical. 65 But it is clear at a minimum
that no such justification currently exists. An adequate account of
jurisdictional due process requires that efforts in this direction be
undertaken.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL AND DOMESTIC
DUE PROCESS COMPARED
It is somewhat curious that the political theory overtones of domes-
tic due process have been recognized while jurisdictional due process
has not been subject to similar theoretical analysis. Jurisdictional due
process is in some respects more obviously amenable to political
analysis, in that certain difficulties with making political theory argu-
ments in the domestic setting are not serious problems with due pro-
cess issues in the jurisdictional setting. Domestic procedural due pro-
cess is problematic in ways that jurisdictional due process is not.
The first domestic due process issue that jurisdictional due process
manages to escape concerns the separation between the substantive
and procedural aspects of an entitlement. To show that there is a
deprivation of due process, the complaining party must show that
there is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Often this threshold
issue is clear, but problems can arise when nontraditional entitlements
are involved. Assume, for instance, that a new federal employee is
hired for a probationary period. At the end of the probationary period,
the employee is laid off with no excuse, and no opportunity to present
evidence about his competence at the job. Is this a violation of due
process?
One might reply that there is no violation of due process because
the employee was only hired for the probationary period. Therefore,
the employee had no right to expect to continue employment. In other
words, the employee was deprived of no property interest, because
the only property interest granted was a job during the probationary
term. This argument is problematic, however, because it can be carried
to extremes. It seems that the government might structure its entitle-
ment programs to incorporate the procedure for termination into the
substantive entitlement.
65. L. Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Boundaries and the Limits of Political Theory (1987) (unpub-
lished manuscript).
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Under this line of reasoning a welfare recipient might be promised
benefits only at the continued whim of the welfare agency. The agency
might, for no reason, discontinue benefits without an evidentiary hear-
ing. If a due process complaint was raised, the agency could defend
on the ground that it had deprived no one of any property, because
the only property interest that was granted was a right to welfare at
the whim of the welfare agency. If the objectionable procedure for
termination of property interests is built in to the definition of the
property interest, then when that objectionable procedure is invoked
there is no deprivation. The result is a "swiss cheese entitlement."66
Whatever the difficulties posed by an inability to separate the
procedural holes from the substantive cheese in such swiss cheese
entitlements, they are unlikely to pose a problem in the context of
jmisdictional due process. Typically, in such instances, one state is
engaged in enforcing or destroying the property interests created by
another state. The state is not taking away with one hand what it
gave with the other; it is taking away with one hand what was granted
by a different state. Therefore, in the multistate context there will
be few situations in which the deprivation can be explained as a pro-
cedural qualification that was built into the right itself. The problem
simply does not arise.
The second problem that is far less bothersome in the multijuris-
dictional context is the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty. This
difficulty always seems to crop up when courts are engaged in the
judicial review of the actions of the elected branches. It has been
particularly troublesome in the due process area, perhaps because the
courts' substantive due process cases are so tenuously linked to the
constitutional text,67 and perhaps because even with regard to pro-
cedm'al due process the words are so vague as to make the judicial
mandate unclear.
I am not particularly bothered with the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty, even in the domestic due process context.68 Regarding limita-
tions written into the Constitution, it does not seem to make much
difference which branch of government is making the decision. If the
courts invalidate legislation, it is true that they are counteracting the
66. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion); see also Terrell, "Properly,"
"Due Pi'Ocess," and the Distinction Between Definition and Thecny in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO.
L.,J. 861, 890-91 (1982).
67. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
68. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability, and the Limits a/the Common Law Method,
57 B.U.L. REV. 807, 817 (1977).
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wishes of the majority. But if Congress fails to enact a popular measure
because some members believe that it violates the Bill of Rights, then
Congress too is acting in a countermajoritarian fashion. The same can
be said if the Executive disagrees with the populace. Counter-
majoritarianism is simply part of the business of respecting constitu-
tional limitations. The fact that countermajoritarianism is engaged in
by appointed rather than elected officials seems rather beside the
point.
A different response in the present context, however, would pertain
even if the countermajoritarian argument were generally sound. Even
if the objection were convincing in the domestic context, it would be
unconvincing in the multijurisdictional arena. The argument seems to
suggest that someone who cannot prevail in the political processes is
being a sore loser when the challenge is reinstated in the courts.
Decisionmaking, it is argued, should proceed in a democratic manner.
The challenger should stick with his or her role in the political process-
es, as being the proper way to amend an unpalatable decision.
This argument cannot be readily made in the multijurisdictional
context. The defendant's very claim is that the state has no right to
regulate him or her. He or she is very likely someone who has no
political participation rights in the political process that made the
decision, for as we have seen, jurisdictional due process arguments
are frequently made by persons who have no right to participate in
the first place. It is for this reason impossible to console the defendant
with the observation that there are political methods for protesting
the decision. He or she may not be entitled to take part in those
processes, and in any event the claim is precisely that this is the
wrong process to have made the decision.
To illustrate this argument, return to the example about arbitra-
tion. Assume that one of the contracting parties disagrees that arbit-
ration is the proper remedy under the contract. He may admit that
the arbitrator is unbiased, willing to hear the evidence, and so forth,
but still deny that it is an appropriate dispute for the arbitrator to
decide. Now it seems that in such cases it is not an adequate response
to tell him to discuss this with the arbitrator. While one might certainly
tell him that strategically this would be a good first step - try to
convince the arbitrator that he or she should decline to hear the
dispute - the mere fact that the arbitrator, after hearing the evidence,
decided not to dismiss does not cure the complainant's problem. His
very complaint is that he should not be subjected to arbitration at all,
and on this issue one would think that the arbitrator's decision as to
his or her own jurisdiction should be subject to review by a court.
Jurisdiction, similarly, concerns the identification of processes to
which one is appropriately subject. Jurisdictional due process, in other
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words, forms the limits within which the countermajoritarian argument
can plausibly be made. Where the particular majority in question is
actually entitled to decide a particular issue, then it may be problematic
for a court to overturn its decision. But this depends upon jurisdiction
having already been established. If the particular majority in question
had no right to address the issue and to exercise its coercive powers,
then the fact that this is invalidated as a violation of procedural due
process is not problematic at all.
Thus we see two issues that plague domestic procedural due process
that do not plague jurisdictional due process to nearly as great a
degree. One final issue, with which jurisdictional due process has as
much difficulty as domestic procedural due process, deserves attention.
That issue is the legitimacy of relying upon natural law arguments
that mayor may not be found in the constitutional text.
The political theory arguments I have outlined above can, with
some plausibility, be attributed to the constitutional text. "Due pro-
cess" is, after all, a rather vague phrase. Given the assumptions during
the Constitution's framing about the territorial limitations on states,
it is not difficult to impute such arguments to the fifth and fourteenth
amendments or the full faith and credit clause. Therefore, it is unneces-
sary to turn explicitly to natural law to define the political theory
limitations on what a state may do in the multijurisdictional context.
It is reasonable to treat political theory as historically embedded in
the constitutional language. The Court has, along these lines, attri-
buted such reasoning to the due process clauses without any hesita-
tions.
A problem would arise, however, if the Constitution could not be
plausibly read to contain such limitations. What if there were no due
process clause, or if the Constitution were amended to make clear
that due process did not apply to jurisdictional issues? What if, for
instance, Congress decided that it wanted to make American regula-
tory laws applicable to disputes arising all over the world? If the due
process clause were amended so as to remove any obstacles to such
application, what should a judge do?
The way I have set up the political theory interpretation of juris-
dictional due process, it seems there would still be serious problems
with application of American law in such cases. If the United States
has no right to regulate some dispute, the fact that it has amended
its Constitution to remove any impediment to regulation does not seem
to solve the issue. Why, after all, should the American Constitution
define the rights of Europeans? The political theory objections that I
have been describing sound in natural law and not positive law. A
mere change in American positive law cannot make that law more
widely applicable, in the face of the objection that application of that
positive law is fundamentally unfair.
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This argument is not the issue of countermajoritarianism, already
discussed. The problem is not merely that a judge is acting in a
countermajoritarian fashion. After all, if the judge were to go ahead
and apply American law to the dispute, that would not be very demo-
cratic either, given that the complaining party is not subject to Amer-
ican democratic processes. Majoritarian principles do not tell us
whether or not to apply the law. But while countermajoritarianism is
not the sticking point, there may still be an argument that judges are
not supposed to turn to natural law. The argument is the judge's
obligation to interpret the positive law they have been appointed to
enforce. This is an argument that could be made in a monarchy or a
dictatorship; it is not an issue of democratic principles.
This difficulty is similar to the problem that arises whenever a
judge is faced with a law that is morally repugnant. Judges are under-
standably torn in such cases between their sense of personal morality
and their views of their official role. In the same way, a pre-civil war
judge would have conflicting obligations arising out of the moral repug-
nance of slavery and the positive duty to enforce fugitive slave laws.
I bring this up merely to point out that solving the countermajoritarian
difficulty does not cure all of the legitimacy issues that reside in the
institution of judicial review. The problem in the jurisdictional due
process context is similar to the judge's other crises of conscience,
and is just as difficult to resolve.
Practically, for the time being, this is not something about which
we have to worry. The due process clause offers ample room for
jurisdictional due process, both in the expansiveness of its language
and in the details of its historical tradition. We will probably never
have to face life without the due process clause. This is fortunate,
because within its scope we find our most important guarantees of
both domestic and jurisdictional procedural legitimacy.
